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ESSAY
STATE ACTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS
Jeffrey L. Fisher*
For the past few years, the federal courts of appeal have been
struggling with the issue of whether employers may enforce compulsory
arbitration clauses against employees who bring employment
discrimination claims under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA"). Compulsory arbitration clauses require
prospective employees, as a condition of obtaining employment, to sign
a contract waiving their rights to a jury trial regarding all future causes
of action. The debate in the federal courts thus far has focused on
whether Congress intended in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("1991 Act"), which amended Title VII, and the ADA, to preclude the
compulsory arbitration of Title VII and ADA claims.
Section 118 of the 1991 Act and section 12212 of the ADA each
state that "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the
use of... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising
under..." these Acts.1 Despite weighty indications in the Acts'
legislative histories that Congress understood only employees' voluntary
decisions to arbitrate existing claims-and not employers' imposition of
contracts mandating compulsory arbitration of any prospective claimsto be "appropriate" and "authorized by law,"'2 five of the six federal
. Associate, Davis Wright Tremaine, Seattle, Washington and Adjunct Professor, University
of
Washington School of Law. J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1997; A.B., Duke
University, 1992. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Professors Deborah Malamud,
Terry Sandalow, Ted St. Antoine, and Adam Samaha.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
2. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 97 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635. The
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circuits to address the issue have held otherwise? Each of these five
circuits has ruled that the "plain language" of the statutes evinces a

congressional will to favor arbitration under any circumstances and thus
trumps any contrary suggestions in the Acts' legislative histories.4 To
date, the Supreme Court has declined to enter the fray.
The majority rule-that the 1991 Act and the ADA support
compulsory and binding arbitration-presents a second, perhaps more
difficult, issue that courts are just beginning to grapple with: whether the

process of compulsory arbitration imposes an unconstitutional condition
of employment in violation of the constitutional right to an Article III
tribunal or the Seventh Amendment's jury-trial guarantee.5 While both

Report on the bill that became the Act states that:
the Committee [on Education and Labor] believes that any agreement to submit disputed
issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id. The same Committee rejected a proposal under which "employers could refuse to hire workers
unless they signed a binding statement waiving all rights to.. . [judicial resolutions of] Title VII
complaints" because that "rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court decisions holding that
workers have the right to go to court, rather than being forced into compulsory arbitration, to
resolve ...employment opportunity rights. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo, 415 U.S. 36
(1974)."). Id. at 104. See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 77 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499-500 (explaining that the ADA's arbitration provision is intended to be
consistent with Gardner-Denver).
3. See Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that compulsory arbitration agreements are enforceable under the 1991 Act); Rosenberg v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding "that neither the
language of the statute nor the legislative history demonstrates an intent in the 1991 CRA to
preclude [compulsory] pre-dispute arbitration agreements"); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc.,
167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir.) (holding "that Congress did not intend Title VII to preclude
enforcement of [compulsory] pre-dispute arbitration agreements .. ."), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 44
(1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that "Title VII [is]
entirely compatible with enforcing compulsory agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims"), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886
(4th Cir.) ("[f]inding that Congress did not intend to preclude arbitration of claims under Title VII
and the Disabilities Act ... "), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996). But see Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir.) (holding that the 1991 Act precludes the
"compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982, and motion granted and
cert. denied,525 U.S. 996 (1998).
4. See Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 204-05; Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 8; Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 365;
Seus, 146 F.3d at 182; Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86.
5. "Article IlI... preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and independent federal
adjudication of claims within the judicial power of the United States ....
" Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986). The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved.... U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. A thorough consideration of the strength of
the substantive argument that applying compulsory arbitration agreements to employment
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Title VII and the ADA both provide for the right to a jury. trial,6 and the
Supreme Court has made it clear that Article m[ rights and the Seventh
Amendment apply, at least to some degree, to employment
discrimination claims,7 the first few federal courts to confront these
constitutional provisions in the compulsory arbitration context have
sidestepped considering their application to such arbitration." Instead
these courts have held that enforcing a private arbitration agreement in
federal court does not amount to the "state action" necessary to trigger
constitutional protections in Article m and the Bill of Rights. 9 If there is
no state action, there can be no constitutional violation. The
unconstitutional conditions argument becomes a nonstarter.
Plaintiffs have attempted to establish state action in the compulsory
arbitration context by making three general arguments: (1) that
adjudicating and enforcing federal civil rights laws is traditionally an
exclusive governmental function;" (2) that federal law requires certain
employees to abide by the rules of professional associations such as the
national securities exchanges, which in turn mandate compulsory
discrimination claims imposes an unconstitutional condition of employment is beyond the scope of
this essay, but (putting aside the issue of whether making arbitration a condition of employment or
statutorily encouraging it is analytically equivalent to mandating it by statute) one commentator has
noted that "[i]f there is any trend to be divined from the cases, the trend may well be against [the
constitutionality of] statutes that compel arbitration." Morris B. Hoffman, The Constitutionalityof
Mandatory Arbitration, 18 COLO. LAW. 455,455 (1989). See also New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v.
Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (inferring that compulsory arbitration schemes
are constitutional if they are not binding); Healy v. Onstott, 237 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (stating that compulsory arbitration statutes "deprive[] an affected party of his constitutional
right to trial.").
6. Title VII (as amended by the 1991 Act) and the ADA expressly provide for the right of a
trial by jury. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
7. See Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208,210 (1998) (per curiam) (dealing with
a claim under Title VII); cf Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974) (holding that the
Seventh Amendment applies to the housing discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1968).
8. The First, Second and Seventh Circuits are the only circuits to address and reject state
action arguments with regard to Title VII or ADA claims. See Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206-07;
Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 17 n.12; Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 368; see also Cremin v. Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1465-69 (N.D. M11.
1997) (finding no state action,
but considering the issue at length). The Ninth Circuit rejected some general state action arguments
against compulsory arbitration, but did not address the question with regard to Title VII or the ADA
because it had already refused to require the arbitration of those claims. See Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1200-02 (9thCir. 1998).
9. See Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 206-07; Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 17 n.12; Koveleskie, 167 F.3d
at 368; Cremin, 957 F. Supp. at 1465-69; Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1200-02.
10. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (stating that state action is
present when a private entity assumes "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State"). See
generally Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-58, 161 (1978) (holding that private entities that
undertake actions that are traditionally exclusive governmental functions constitute state actors).
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arbitration;" and (3) that federal agencies like the SEC have approved of
industries' practices of compulsory arbitration. 2 None has worked. Wellestablished law holds that dispute resolution, even in the federal civil

rights context, is not an "exclusive" governmental function, 3 and
nothing about the intricacies of federal regulation in the securities
industry (or any other industry) has convinced the federal courts that a

private industry's unprompted decision to require arbitration is fairly
attributable to the government. Even if the second or third arguments
eventually succeed, only securities-industry personnel would likely
benefit, leaving plaintiffs who are required to sign garden-variety
compulsory arbitration agreements to fend for themselves.
But, under the majority's construction of the 1991 Act and the

ADA, there is a stronger, more straightforward argument in favor of
finding state action in these cases. The text of the Acts' arbitration

provisions, which expressly "encourage[s]" such arbitration, 4 constitutes
state action. Lest this proposition seem too simplistic to be compelling,
bear in mind that the Supreme Court has long recognized that statutes

encouraging or supporting private conduct can represent state action.' s
Some thirty years ago, for instance, the State of California enacted a
constitutional amendment that authorized private individuals to
discriminate on the basis of race in selling and renting their property."

11. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1200-01 (rejecting Plaintiff's argument that state action is
present because "'federal law requires all broker-dealers to register with a national securities
exchange... and to abide by the rules of that exchange - including its mandatory arbitration rules as a condition of their continued employment."').
12. See id. at 1201-02 (dismissing Plaintiff's claim that state action exists because national
securities exchanges are required to get their rules approved by the SEC).
13. See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (1lth Cir. 1995); Elmore v.
Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986). For an argument in favor of courts
reconsidering this view, see Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 619-25 (1997).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
15. For older decisions holding that state laws or policies effectively supporting racial
discrimination constituted state action, see Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961) (holding that the restaurant's refusal to serve African Americans constituted state action
because the State, by leasing its premises to a private party and declining to prohibit the
discrimination, "elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination"); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 76 (1932) (holding that a statute empowering the
executive committee of a political party to prescribe the qualifications of its members constituted
state action because it gave the party the legal authority, which it may not have had previously, to
bar African Americans from voting in primaries); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
235 U.S. 151, 162 (1914) (holding that a statute that authorized carriers to provide railroad cars for
Whites but not for African Americans constituted state action because carriers refusing to serve
African Americans would be "acting in the matter under the authority of a state law").
16. The amendment read in relevant part:
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The Supreme Court found that this law constituted state action because
the effect of the law was that it "changed the situation from one in which
discrimination was restricted [under state law] 'to one wherein it [was]
encouraged. ... "' "Those practicing racial discriminations need no
longer rely solely on their personal choice,"' the Court explained. "They
could now invoke express constitutional authority, free from censure or
interference of any kind from official sources."'9 To be sure, the Court's
decision, and others like it, were rendered during the high water mark of
its state action jurisprudence and hinged to a significant degree on what
it viewed as a pressing need to eradicate pervasive race discrimination."
The basis for the rulings nevertheless remains sound: Placing the
legislative imprimatur of the government behind a socially disdained, or
even controversial, practice can deflect accountability of a private actor
so substantially as to make its decision to adopt that practice fairly
attributable to the state.
The Supreme Court's more recent state-action decisions, even as
they have restricted the scope of this doctrine, have carried forward this
principle of governmental "encouragement." In Blum v. Yaretsky,2 ' the
modem blueprint for the Rehnquist Court's state action doctrine, the
Court explained that "a State normally can be held responsible for a
private decision only when it... has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State." Applying this principle in 1989, the
Court found state action in a private railroad's drug testing program in
large part because the Federal Railroad Administration had drafted
regulations expressing a "strong preference for [drug] testing" and had

neither the State nor any agency thereof 'shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or
indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part
or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or
persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.'
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 369 (1967) (quoting Art. I, §26 of the Cal. Constitution in

1964).
17. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375 (quoting a decision of the California Supreme Court); see also
id. at 381 (emphasizing that the California Supreme Court believed that the law would "significantly
encourage and involve the State in private discriminations").
18. Id. at 377.
19. Id.
20. See generally Burton, 365 U.S. at 725-26 (holding that the govermnent violated the
Constitution by for failing to prohibit discrimination by a restaurant); Nixon, 286 U.S. at 76 (holding
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited political parties from barring African Americans from
voting in primaries).
21. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
22. Id. at 1004.
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explicitly conferred on railroads the authority to perform such tests. 2
The Court concluded that the Administration's written regulations
moved beyond mere approval of the challenged action into the realm of
"encouragement,[and] endorsement" of that action.24 And just two terms
ago, the Court reaffirmed these tenets by holding that a Pennsylvania
law that authorized insurance companies to unilaterally withhold
payment of disputed medical services did not amount to state action
because the law merely "authorized" the companies' conduct consistent
with the status quo.2 "Such permission of a private choice," the Court
repeatedly emphasized, fell critically short of "encourag[ing]" that
I
choice.26
Under the majority interpretation of the ADA and the 1991 Act,
Congress has not only authorized, but-by its own words-has
"encouraged" employers to condition employment on prospective
employees' waiving their right to pursue prospective ADA or Title VII
claims in federal court. 7 This difference between statutorily allowing
and "encouraging," as should now be apparent, is not mere semantics.
To allow a course of conduct is to watch from the stands; to encourage it
is to go down to one sideline and whisper in the coach's ear. To
"encourage" conduct, in other words, is to endorse it as the preferred
option. It is to put the weight of the state behind its use.
Assuming that the majority rule is correct that Congress sought to
"encourage" the compulsory arbitration of Title VII and ADA claims,
Congress' pronouncement was especially significant, for it ran contrary
to, and effectively overruled, the universally accepted judicial
presumption of over fifteen years that arbitration could not "provide an
adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal
statutory" rights embodied in statutes like Title VII.2 It reversed it with a
wallop. From the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,29 until 1990, the year the ADA was enacted and
the 1991 Act was drafted, every circuit court to address the issue held
that Title VII and statutes with comparable enforcement mechanisms
forbade all forms of compulsory arbitration." Even apart from the
23.
24.

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989).
Id. at 615-16 (emphasis added).

25. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,52-53 (1999).
26. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1999).
28. McDonald v. City of w. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (describing the Supreme

Court's holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)).
29. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
30. See id. at 56; see, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.
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judiciary, the desirability of employers' conditioning employment on the

signing of compulsory arbitration contracts was in 1990 and 1991-and
continues to be today-a matter of deep disagreement among scholars
and society at large.3 But like the dramatic action by the California
electorate in Reitman v. Mulkey, 32 Congress-according to the majority
rule-not only decided to allow arbitration of Title VII and ADA claims

to be binding, but it "encouraged" the arbitral resolution of such
prospective disputes, even to the point of pushing employers to make the

point a condition of employment. Employers that formerly would not
have thought to require all employees to sign away their right to bring

discrimination lawsuits in federal court, or at least would have been
quite wary of doing so for fear of generating ill will amongst its current
and potential workforce, suddenly found themselves "encouraged" by

Congress to adopt such policies.
One may nevertheless believe-and I must confess that I have
sympathy for the view-that pinning a state-action argument on one
word in a statute seems a bit overly formalistic. Congress, after all,

might have achieved the same substantive legal result in the Acts (i.e.,
permitting the enforcement of compulsory arbitration contracts) simply
by using the word "authorized" instead of "encouraged." But the circuits
that have determined that Congress blessed compulsory arbitration in the
1991 Act and the ADA have been heavily influenced by the textual
1990); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 185-87 (1st Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt.
Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir. 1988); Rosenfeld v. Dep't of Army, 769
F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1985); see also EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1431
(9th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (stating that a prior approved consent decree
cannot preclude an employee's right to judicial resolution under Title VII ).
31. Compare, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory
Employment Claims,72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1344-50 (1997) (arguing that compulsory arbitration
is an acceptable means of resolving employment disputes where proper procedural safeguards are in
place and setting forth the recent history of debate on this topic) with Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
MandatoryArbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1996) (opposing mandatory arbitration in employment disputes). Of
course, I do not mean to imply that those supporting compulsory arbitration were in 1990-91, or are
today, taking a position approximating those who support race discrimination. The right to a jury
trial, however, is-like the right to equal protection-a fundamental constitutional right, and should
not, until a person voluntarily decides to surrender it, be dismissed lightly. In addition, while we all
may generally agree today that race discrimination by private parties is wrong, it is important to
recall that the desirability of segregation was very much an open issue at the time the Supreme
Court issued its decisions finding state action in the public support and authorization of
discrimination. The Civil Rights Acts, in which the federal government finally decided to hold
many private actors to constitutional standards, were not passed until the 1960s.
32. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that state action was present where the electorate passed a
California constitutional amendment that authorized private individuals to discriminate on the basis
of race in selling and renting their property).
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difference between authorizing and encouraging.3 They have perceived
Congress' use of the term "encouraged" as fatally incompatible with
suggestions that Congress intended to preserve the judicial presumption

against the validity of practices as coercive as compulsory arbitration.34
"[B]arring the application of mandatory arbitration agreements to Title
VII claims[,]" the Second Circuit reasoned, "would conflict with the
express statutory term 'encouraged' in §118" and with "Congress' aim

to foster arbitration." 5 The Third Circuit likewise explained in a passage
later agreed with by the Seventh Circuit: "On its face, the text of § 118
evinces a clear Congressional intent to encourage arbitration... not to

preclude such arbitration."' In the Fourth Circuit's view, "It]he meaning
of [the Acts'] language is plain-Congress is in favor of arbitration,"
including compulsory arbitration.
I am not a strict adherent to the "plain language" method of
statutory interpretation, but I gather that one of the principal

justifications for ignoring other indicia of statutory meaning or
congressional intent is that the words that Congress enacts in statutes

enjoy a unique status. Our national government speaks most forcefully
through the language of its laws. This, I take it, is the impetus behind the
majority's view that Congress would not have used the strident word
"encouraged" if it intended to place (or preserve) restrictions on

employers' ability to impose arbitration on their employees.38 But if the
plain meaning of Congress' word "encouraged" is powerful enough to

squelch any suggestion that compulsory arbitration clauses remain
unenforceable against certain employment discrimination claims, surely
33. See generally Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 205-06 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that the use of "the word 'encouraged' is free of ambiguit[ies] when viewed in the
context of the purpose of [Title VIi]" and must be construed to condone the waiver of judicial
remedies); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361,365 (7th Cir.) (holding that the text
of the Act encourages arbitration and the words "authorized by law" are merely references to the
FAA), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 44 (1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding that the phrase "authorized by law" is only a reference to the FAA), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1139 (1999); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881-82 (4th
Cir.) (holding that the use of the word "encourage" within the plain language of the Act favors
arbitration), cert. denied,519 U.S. 980 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205-06.
35. Id. at 205.
36. Seus, 146 F.3d at 182; Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 365 (quoting Seus).
37. Austin, 78 F.3d at 881-82.
38. See Desiderio,191 F.3d at 205; Seus, 146 F.3d at 182. For an academic piece taking this
position, see Kristen Decker & William Krizner, The Fallacy of Duffield v. Robertson and
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch: The Continuing Viability of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Title VII
ArbitrationAgreements in the Post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 Era, 1998 J. DisP. REsOL. 141, 146-47
(1998).
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that word is sufficient to make an employer's decision to honor
Congress' "plainly" expressed preference in this regard fairly
attributable to the federal government.
Congress, to my knowledge, has never before statutorily
"encouraged" a course of conduct regarding employment relations that
potentially treads on employees' constitutional rights. But suppose that it
enacted the following hypothetical statute: "The use of compulsory
employment contracts that allow for random and suspicionless searches,
including searches of employees' homes, automobiles, and other private
effects, is encouraged to defer employees from engaging in misconduct."
Or how about: "The use of compulsory employment contracts that
require employees to refrain from engaging in public debate regarding
politics is encouraged to promote tranquility in the workplace." The use
of the word "encouraged" is jarring in both contexts, and I venture to say
that courts faced with challenges to such provisions would not hesitate to
find state action and unconstitutional conditions of employment. This is
not to suggest that the substantive jury trial and Article II issues in the
compulsory arbitration context are anywhere near as clear cut, but it is to
say that the state action inquiry in all three cases is essentially the same.
If one believes that Title VII and ADA claims should preclude the
enforcement of compulsory arbitration clauses, there is one final
advantage to hinging the state-action argument to the statutory language.
of the 1991 Act and the ADA: courts can, and should, construe statutes
to avoid serious constitutional questions." No matter how resolutely
some circuits maintain that the "plain language" of the Acts encourages
compulsory arbitration, there is undeniable ambiguity in the Acts'
"encourage[ment]" of arbitration "[w]here appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law... ." Even putting aside the inherently opaque term
"appropriate," there is, given the remedial purposes of the ADA and the
1991 Act,4" genuine room to dispute whether Congress was referring to
39. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (stating
that "[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional
adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such
adjudication is unavoidable").
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
41. Both statues are "remedial" in that they seek to provide remedies for improper
discrimination. The 1991 Act is "remedial" in an important additional sense as well: The purpose of
the Act was to statutorily "overrule" a series of 1989 Supreme Court decisions that Congress
thought unduly narrowed the reach of Title VII. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,
250-51 (1994). The 1991 Act also strengthened Title VII by making it easier to bring and to prove
such lawsuits. For example, it afforded plaintiffs the right to jury trials, more expansive fee-shifting
provisions, and the right to punitive damages. See id at 252; Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205.
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42 which, since its
the Supreme Court "law" of Gardner-Denver,
pronouncement in 1974, was understood to preclude any binding
arbitration of Title VII claims,43 or the new "law" of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,' which, in 1991, permitted the
compulsory arbitration of age discrimination claims and signaled that the
Court would likely rule the same way in the Title VII or ADA context. 5
This is especially so due to the timing of the Acts' drafting and passages.
The ADA was enacted in 1990, before Gilmer was decided. The 1991
Act was likewise reported out by the House Education and Labor
Committee with the understanding that Gardner-Denver was the
controlling law, but was enacted six months after Gilmer was decided. 6
Faced with the serious question of whether the 1991 Act and the ADA
impermissibly encourage employers to place an unconstitutional
condition on employment, courts might be well advised to construe the
Acts to encourage only voluntary arbitration, which is undoubtedly
constitutionally permissible, and which Congress may well have
intended anyway.
Justice Frankfurter was fond of saying that there are three cardinal
principles of statutory construction: "(1) Read the statute; (2) read the
'
statute; (3) read the statute!"47
By carefully applying these three
principles, courts holding that the ADA and the 1991 Act authorize the
compulsory arbitration of ADA and Title VII claims may well be
required also to find that state action exists when employers invoke
those Acts in order to compel such arbitration. That action exists in the
most unsurprising place one might expect to find governmental action:
in the laws it enacted.

42. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
43. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1990); Utley v.

Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 185-87 (Ist Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l,
Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir. 1988); Rosenfeld v. Dep't of Army, 769 F.2d 237, 239 (4th

Cir. 1985).
44. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
45. See id. at 34-35. The Court in Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denverprimarily on the
ground that it involved a collective bargaining agreement rather than an individual agreement to
arbitrate; the Court did not comment on any differences between the ADEA and Title VII (or the
ADA). See id. at 34-35. The Court has since observed that there is "obviously some tension"
between Gardner-Denverand Gilmer, but has not had occasion to sort out where the current fault

line of arbitrability lies. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,76-77 (1998).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 97, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 (setting
forth legislative history stating that the statutes were using Gardner-Denveras the controlling law);
see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 77, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499-500 (stating
that the approach of Gardner-Denverapplies equally to the ADA).
47. Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30, 36 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
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